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MINORITY THREAT AND POLICE
STRENGTH FROM 1980 TO 2000:
A FIXED-EFFECTS ANALYSIS OF
NONLINEAR AND INTERACTIVE EFFECTS
IN LARGE U.S. CITIES*
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University of Nevada, Las Vegas

DAVID JACOBS
Ohio State University

KEYWORDS: minority threat, police per capita, city level trends,
interactions, nonlinear relationships
Many studies have assessed threat theory by investigating the
relationships between the size of minority populations and police
strength. Yet these investigations analyzed older data with crosssectional designs. This study uses a fixed-effects panel design to detect
nonlinear and interactive relationships between minority presence and
the per capita number of police in large U.S. cities in the last three
census years. The findings show that the relationship between racial
threat and the population-corrected number of police officers has
recently become considerably stronger. In accord with theoretically
based expectations, tests for interactions show that segregated cities with
larger African American populations have smaller departments. The
coefficients on another interaction effect suggest that racial segregation
leads to reductions in police strength in the South perhaps because
officers are less likely to intervene in residentially isolated black
neighborhoods in this region.
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What is the relationship between the presence of racial minorities in
large U.S. cities and the strength of police departments, and how does this
relationship fluctuate over time? In comparison to other nations, race
relations throughout U.S. history have been exceptionally antagonistic and
violent (de Tocqueville, 1835/1948; Myrdal, 1944), and this racial violence
was not confined to the civil war that occurred almost 150 years ago.
Immediately after that war and for more than 80 years following,
vigilantes lynched blacks to maintain a racial caste system (Tolnay and
Beck, 1996). More recently, the conventional public wisdom has viewed
urban violence as almost entirely due to racial and ethnic minorities
(Chiricos, Welch and Gertz, 2004). Multiple findings suggest that majority
whites, apparently threatened by the presence of large minority
populations (Fosset and Kiecolt, 1989; Taylor, 1998), often make
successful political demands for additional police officers in cities with the
most minority residents (Jacobs, 1979, Liska, Lawrence and Bensen, 1981;
Jackson, 1989).
Some characteristics of police work help explain why this independent
relationship is often reported. Due to chronic uncertainties, the behavior
of officers on the street is primarily reactive rather than proactive (Wilson,
1971; Rubenstein, 1973; Ericson, 1982, 1989). Police officers are not
abundant in relation to the populations they must control (Sherman,
1992). Because officers cannot read minds nor see into buildings, they find
it difficult to identify recent law breakers or those who are about to
commit such acts (Rubenstein, 1973; Ericson, 1982, 1989). Choices about
who to stop must be made on the basis of anomalies and crude decision
rules (Weitzer and Tuch, 2002; Lundman and Kaufman, 2003). These
decisions, because they are based on group rather than individual
characteristics, often result in statistical discrimination (Rubenstein, 1973;
Ericson, 1982, 1989). Officers also face special handicaps in underclass
neighborhoods because street criminals and the innocent share many
characteristics in such districts.
But if the police are particularly numerous relative to a city’s
population, their reliance on anomalies should make them more effective
in white neighborhoods, where residents tend to be visibly distinct from
minority street criminals (Jacobs, 1979; Manning, 1994). Even if the police
do not make unwarranted efforts to please whites, whites should benefit
from larger departments. It is plausible that the geographic boundaries
insulating white neighborhoods from underclass street criminals should be
less permeable in cities with a higher ratio of officers. This logic suggests
that additional officers should be present in communities when white
anxieties about crime are magnified by substantial minority populations
(Liska, Lawrence and Sanchirico, 1982; Quillian and Pager, 2001). Yet the
studies that tested this relationship suffered from some important

difficulties that we hope to correct with a pooled time-series research
design.
Multiple studies have assessed the relationship between racial or ethnic
minorities and police strength (Jacobs, 1979; Liska et al., 1981; Jackson,
1989), yet almost all were cross-sectional. Shifts in the strength of the
association between minority presence and the number of police officers
could not be detected. Greenberg, Kessler and Loftin (1985) used a panel
design, but they entered explanatory variables from the previous census to
account for police strength a decade later. Such a long lag is implausible: it
should not take ten years for these relationships to be completed.
Greenberg and his colleagues included a lagged dependent variable on the
right side of their models, yet both correlated measurement error between
the dependent variable and its lag and serial correlation weakened the
coefficients on the other explanatory variables. Most of the cities in the
Greenberg sample were smaller than those in studies finding greater
support for racial threat. This reduced support is not surprising, given that
the literature suggests that informal control is more effective in small
cities. Racially threatened whites therefore have greater reasons to
demand additional police officers in the larger cities analyzed in most of
the literature. Although race mattered in only some of their analyses,
methodological problems suggest that the Greenberg findings should be
reexamined.
The literature has additional gaps. Despite some of the implications of
threat theory, few tests for interactive relationships have been conducted,
and there may be problems with omitted variable bias. We have not
located studies that analyzed data after 1990. In the absence of such
studies we do not know if the association between minority presence and
police strength persists or if it has recently become stronger. In contrast to
the Greenberg et al. study, we use a less questionable pooled time-series,
fixed-effects approach to disentangle the interactive, nonlinear and
fluctuating relationships between African American or Hispanic presence
and the population corrected number of police officers in U.S. cities in the
last three census years.1 Although we test hypotheses derived from other
1.

In comparison to cross-sectional approaches, pooled time-series cross-sectional
alternatives offer multiple benefits. The combination of multiple cross-sections
expands the number of cases. One result is that variable variance is increased and
multicollinearity typically is reduced in such designs. In comparison to pure crosssectional research designs, pooled time-series cross-sectional approaches therefore
offer increased statistical power and all of the other inferential benefits that come
with larger samples. And the fixed-effects procedure that can be used in pooled
designs provides an effective way to reduce problems with omitted variable bias
that plague non experimental research. In addition to these advantages, controls
for period let researchers test for time-specific interactions. Such specifications can
uncover historically contingent relationships by detecting associations between

theoretical perspectives, our primary goal is to provide superior tests of
refinements to the racial threat version of conflict theory.
THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS
MINORITY THREAT
Racial fissures once were and probably still are the most important
social and political division in the United States. These schisms may
explain alterations in law and order measures such as the number of police
officers in large cities, because the threat posed by comparatively
substantial minority groups should produce increasingly severe measures
against street crime. Both sociologists and political scientists have
provided the conceptual foundation for this threat account (Key, 1949;
Blumer, 1958; Blalock, 1967; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). Ethnocentric
beliefs and dominant group tendencies to view minorities as interlopers
strengthen dominant group presumptions that they should have exclusive
claims over important rights and privileges (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996).
Majority groups’ entrenched beliefs about their “rightful” position and
their unfavorable opinions about minorities emerge from the political
struggles that occur when minorities seek more equitable distributions
(Blumer, 1958). Larger minority populations jeopardize the political and
cultural ascendancy of majority groups, who frequently react by
supporting political measures that are designed to help them maintain
their privileged position.
This presence of hostile views about minorities provides one of the
conceptual links between the threat posed by large minority populations
and law and order outcomes. Negative opinions about blacks are more
likely in areas with larger black populations (Fosset and Kiecolt, 1989;
Taylor, 1998). As one might expect, relatively substantial minority
populations produce increased white votes for anti-minority candidates
(Giles and Buckner, 1993; Giles and Hertz, 1994). Findings also show that
majority whites express greater anxieties about criminal victimization in
communities with more black residents. With crime rates held constant,
both Liska et al. (1982) and Quillian and Pager (2001) find independent
positive relationships between the percentage of blacks in cities or in
neighborhoods and fear of crime.
In light of these results, it should not be surprising that multiple studies
support the next link in this causal chain by suggesting that the anxieties
and resentments that arise from minority threat lead dominant ethnic
explanatory and dependent variables that differ in strength by period (see
Kennedy, 2003 for a more extensive discussion of these and other benefits).

groups to pressure political authorities to make greater efforts to control
street crime. A longitudinal analysis suggests that growth in the presence
of nonwhites leads to subsequent increases in spending on prisons and jails
(Jacobs and Helms, 1999). Jacobs and Carmichael (2001) use fixed-effects
estimation and find that U.S. states with the most substantial African
American and Hispanic populations have higher imprisonment rates. Such
results and the repeated cross-sectional findings showing that cities with
large minority populations either have more police officers relative to
their population (Jacobs, 1979; Huff and Stahure, 1980; Liska et al., 1981)
or spend larger amounts on the police (Jackson and Carroll, 1981; Jackson,
1989) combine to suggest that: The per capita number of police officers will
be greater in cities with the most substantial percentages of black residents.
In some cities Hispanics are largest underclass minority, so the same logic
leads to an expectation that: The per capita number of police officers will
be greater in cities with the largest percentage of Hispanic residents.
But the relationship between Hispanic presence and police size may not
be linear. In many cities outside the southwest, the percentage of
Hispanics is extremely modest. The median percentage in our sample, for
example, was 4.9 percent but the median percentage of blacks was 20.9
percent. Because the Hispanic population was so small in so many cities, it
is plausible that this minority must reach a threshold size before majority
whites consider this group as sufficiently threatening. We therefore predict
that: the nonlinear relationship between the percentage of Hispanic residents
and the per capita number of police officers should become positive after
the relative size of this ethnic minority reaches a level that threatens majority
whites.
Yet the relationships between minority threat due to larger black
populations and law enforcement strength may not be additive. Social
outcomes often depend on the joint appearance of more than one set of
conditions that each of must be present in sufficient strength. Another
implication of threat theory can be assessed by assessing the interactive
effects of residential segregation. We start with the additive component by
hypothesizing that: whites should not feel as menaced by larger black
populations when residential segregation is pronounced. We thus expect
that enhanced residential separations between the races should reduce the
population-corrected police presence, but this relationship may be present
only in cities with relatively large African American populations.
Racial threat theory therefore suggests an interactive relationship
between percentage of African Americans and residential segregation,
particularly if police departments are less likely to interfere in black affairs
when this minority is isolated from whites. Studies suggest that segregation
reduces racial threat because relatively separated neighborhoods make
blacks less threatening to whites. This residential isolation lowers arrest

probabilities (Stolzenberg, D’Alessio and Eitle, 2004; Liska, Chamlin and
Read, 1985; Liska and Chamlin, 1984) in part because segregation reduces
white victimization by African American street criminals (Liska and
Chamlin, 1984). Such declines in white victimization should alleviate white
pressure on political authorities to do something about crimes committed
by blacks (Stolzenberg et al., 2004: 676). If this logic is correct and
departments are not likely to police ghetto neighborhoods as vigorously
when residential segregation is pronounced, the most racially segregated
cities need not have as many officers as their less segregated counterparts.
With main effects held constant we therefore expect that: when residential
segregation and the percentage of blacks are both substantial, the per capita
number of police officers should be reduced. This proposition implies that
the coefficient on an interaction term based on the product of residential
segregation and city percentages of African Americans should be
negative.
Another contingent relationship is equally plausible. James Q. Wilson
(1971: 141) talks about police departments that avoid enforcing the law,
particularly in minority neighborhoods, unless behavior in such
neighborhoods offends high-status whites. The police in these cities
assume that blacks both want and deserve “less law enforcement because
to the police their conduct suggests a low level of private morality, an
unwillingness to cooperate with the police or offer information, and
widespread criminality.” Such departments largely ignore African
Americans “because they have no influence and their conduct, except
within broad limits is not thought to be self regulating” (141).
Such views should be most common in the South. It seems likely as well
that a policy of reduced law enforcement in the ghetto should be least
offensive to high-status whites when residential segregation is most intense
and whites have less contact with blacks. Because departments that avoid
intervening in the ghetto need not be as large as their counterparts that
vigorously police the ghetto, the most residentially segregated cities in the
South should therefore have fewer police officers. This hypothesis suggests
that the coefficient on an interaction term calculated on the product of
residential segregation and location in the South should also be negative.
It follows that a larger African American presence ought to produce
additional police officers, but racially segregated southern cities or highly
segregated cities with the most black residents should have fewer officers
relative to their population.
Finally, the pooled time-series approach we use in this analysis can
address another important issue. Due in part to the increased emphasis on
the racial aspects of departures from law and order in political campaigns
during the period at issue (Edsal and Edsal, 1991; Beckett, 1997; Stucky,
Heimer and Lang, 2005), perhaps the magnitude of the association

between racial threat and police strength has increased. According to
Beckett, increases in strident political claims about street crime during this
period enhanced the public salience of the racial aspects of law and order
and contributed to enhanced resentments against black street criminals
(1997). Findings support such claims as indicators of the political strength
of the political party that emphasized law and order and minority presence
became stronger predictors of imprisonment rates in the states during this
period (Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001). To gauge equivalent shifts in the
intensity of the relationship between minority presence and police
strength, we enter interactions between African American presence and
period. If the association between racial threat and police strength became
more substantial from 1980 to 2000, we can expect to find positive
coefficients on interaction terms calculated with the product of the
percentage of blacks and the dummy variables we use to capture otherwise
unmeasured period effects on police strength.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
POLITICAL ACCOUNTS
Spending on police departments represents a substantial share of
municipal revenues, so political explanations should matter. Although
city-level political measures are not abundant, one institutional
arrangement ought to be influential. In the early part of the 20th century,
government by unelected city manager was championed by upper middle
class progressives who sought to depoliticize municipal administration and
reduce the power of the urban political machines supported by new
immigrants from eastern and southern Europe. Progressives claimed that
appointed managers—who would not be subject to the whims of
unsophisticated voters or induced to win their votes with corrupt
practices—would be more likely to make efficient decisions. One analysis
suggests that the process we study is at least partially political as
expansions in police employees are greater in local election years (Levitt,
1997). Another finds that municipalities with a city manager are
dominated by well-educated citizens (Jacobs and O’Brien, 1998). Such
upper middle class communities should be less responsive to racially
motivated public demands for law and order. And city administrators who
do not face the voters can better resist media driven panics about street
crime and the resulting public pressures to hire additional but unnecessary
officers. For these reasons, we expect fewer police officers in cities with a
city manager.

SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION
Garland claims that enhanced public demands for law and order are
produced by social disorganization (2000). This condition may account
for stronger police departments after crime rates have been held
constant. Some violence and other threatening acts that result from
social disorganization may not be captured by the crime rates, but these
unruly acts may lead to enhanced public anxieties and added political
pressure to hire more officers (Tyler and Boeckman, 1997; Garland,
2001). Holding such factors constant is important because jurisdictions
with larger minority populations may hire new law enforcement
personnel, but not necessarily due to minority threat. Instead, public
anxieties and resentments arising from social disorganization are likely
to appear in cities where underclass minority populations are most
substantial. If disorganization effects are not held constant, we could not
rule out the possibility that citizens, when they successfully pressure
political authorities to hire more officers, are responding to the unruly
acts due to social disorganization rather than to minority threat. These
considerations suggest that cities with larger percentages of families
below the poverty line or with higher divorce rates will have more
officers. Divorce rates should be especially influential because the police
often must intervene in violent domestic disputes, but this relationship
may not be linear because these rates may only produce additional
police officers after a threshold in these rates is reached. To capture
another dimension of social disorganization, we hold constant crowding
or the proportion of dwelling units with more than 1.01 persons per
room.
ADDITIONAL EXPLANATIONS
Police services represent a significant drain on municipal budgets.
Because police work is labor intensive, at least 80 percent of department
funds are spent on officer wages. It follows that the number of officers
should partly depend on the tax base. In this study we do not use the
department percentage of city revenues to capture this effect. Although
city governments can decide to increase taxes in order to hire additional
officers, such decisions are constrained by the resources available to be
taxed. The point is that if political demands for expansions in the number
of officers are sufficiently intense, cities could secure the necessary
revenue by increasing taxes, but the proportion of city revenues spent on
law enforcement could remain constant. The resources that can be taxed,
however, ultimately depend on resident incomes. We deliberately assess
actual resource constraints using city income levels rather than the more
discretionary proportion of city revenues spent on the police.

Studies of criminal punishment have repeatedly focused on the neoMarxist hypothesis that punishment is used to control the excess supply of
labor in capitalist societies (Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1939). Many
investigations assessed the link between unemployment and incarceration,
but the results have been inconclusive. A literature review, for example,
shows that only about 60 percent of the 147 associations between
unemployment and imprisonments are significant and positive (Chiricos
and Delone, 1992). In spite of such mixed findings, it is reasonable to
expect that high joblessness rates will produce expansions in police officers
because high status politically influential citizens may view the
unemployed as a threat to social order (Chambliss, 1964) or because
substantial unemployment leads to resentments against underclass
criminals and thus magnifies public demands for additional law
enforcement capacity.
It is important to examine the explanatory power of city size because
the likelihood of successfully identifying criminal offenders is enhanced in
the smallest cities (Jackson, 1984; Mayhew and Levinger, 1976). The
resulting enforcement difficulties in large municipalities suggest that
departments should have more officers relative to their population in the
most populous communities. Finally, because the number of officers
should be greater in cities with higher crime rates, we examine the
explanatory power of the property and the violent crime rates. But many
of these crimes may not be important enough to influence police strength.
Because the far more serious homicides should produce greater anxieties,
the murder rates rather than the violent or the property crime rates should
be included in the models as well. The homicide rates are measured with
greater accuracy than the other index crimes reported in the Uniform
Crime Reports (UCRs), but these rates may have a nonlinear relationship
with the number of police officers. Perhaps, after these rates have gone
past a threshold, additional homicides will substantially enhance the
probability of successful public demands for additional officers.

METHODOLOGY
SAMPLE
Due to severe limits on data availability in off census years, we analyze
the determinants of police strength in 1980, 1990 and 2000 in U.S. cities
that had populations greater than 100,000 in 1980. Using separated periods
in a pooled time-series analysis is advantageous because such a sampling
procedure reduces serial correlation and the effects of measurement error
(Johnston and DiNardo, 1997). Pooled time-series cross-sectional
estimators are robust to shifts in the number of cases included in different

periods (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997; Wooldridge 2002), but in this
instance few such differences are present. The number of cities included in
this analysis in 1980 and in 1990 is 125, but falls to 123 in the 2000 crosssection, leaving 373 city-years in all analyses.
ESTIMATION
In contrast to the random-effects approach used in most panel analyses
in criminology, the fixed-effects alternative holds constant any unchanging
case attributes by (in effect) entering separate dummy variables for each
city. This makes fixed-effects estimates unbiased when unmeasured timeinvariant city characteristics associated with the explanatory variables
influence the dependent variable. In comparison to random-effects,
stronger claims can be made that omitted variables are not distorting such
estimates (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997; Wooldridge, 2002; see Kennedy,
2003 for an enumeration of additional statistical advantages). These casespecific dummy variables used in fixed-effects analyses represent different
intercepts for each city. Such city-specific intercepts will capture any
unchanging city differences in the number of police officers that are
idiosyncratic. For instance, regional effects are automatically held constant
in fixed-effects models. We also control for otherwise unmeasured period
shocks that may have influenced police strength in many cities by
including time-specific dummy variables in the models (for precedent, see
Eitle, D’Alessio and Stolzenberg, 2002; Kent and Jacobs, 2004). The
relationships at issue therefore will be estimated with two-way fixedeffects models in part because Hausman tests indicate that fixed-effects
and random-effects estimates differ significantly.
MEASUREMENT
We measure racial threat with the natural log of the percentage of
African Americans (some variables are in natural log form to reduce
outliers and heteroskedasticity). Ethnic threat is measured with the
percentage of Hispanics.2 Residential segregation is assessed with the
index of dissimilarity based on the odds that any black will come into
contact with any white. City manager presence is captured with a dummy
variable coded 1 for cities with this arrangement. We gauge the tax base
with real (corrected for inflation) median family income, and include the

2.

Because Hispanics are concentrated in the Southwest, in this paper we emphasize
racial rather than Hispanic threat. Although this analysis of all large cities will
provide some theoretically interesting findings about Hispanic threat, a study that
focuses on the menace of Hispanics probably should be restricted to a sample of
large cities in the Southwest and in the West.

natural log of FBI violent and property crime rates in some models and
the murder rates and their square in others. We measure social
disorganization with percentage divorced, the natural log of the
percentage of families with incomes below the poverty line, and the
natural log of the percentage of dwelling units with more than 1.01 persons
per room.3 Population is included in these models to capture the
independent effects of city size.
Period effects that may influence department strength across all cities in
a particular year are held constant by including two dummy variables
coded 1 for 1990 and for 2000. To assess the degree to which the
relationship between the percentage of blacks and police strength
fluctuates, in some models we include two interaction terms calculated
with the products of the two period dummy variables and the percentage
of African Americans. We expect that the racial threat relationship has
become stronger, so the coefficients on these two interaction terms should
be positive. Recall that additional interaction terms include the product of
the percentage of blacks and racial segregation along with the product of
racial segregation and a dummy variable coded 1 for southern cities. All
required main effects are entered in models that assess the explanatory
power of interactions.4
The percentage of African Americans and the segregation rates are
mean centered before they are multiplied to create the interaction terms.
In models that gauge interaction effects, the coefficient on a mean
centered main effect represents this variable’s additive contribution when
the alternative mean centered main effect is equal to its mean. If mean
centering is not used, the coefficient on each main effect depicts the
additive relationship between that main effect and the dependent variable
when the value of the alternative main effect is equal to zero. In addition
3.

4.

We include the percentage below the poverty line in part because measures of
income inequality are not available (the census stopped supplying the Gini index
for cities after 1980). City scores on the Gini index, however, are closely associated
with the percentage below the poverty line as findings suggest that most of the
variation in the Gini index is due to the gap between lower and middle income
recipients (Jacobs 1980).
To produce the most accurate results, we follow the advice of econometricians and
include many controls in the models. For example, Johnston says "it is more serious
to omit relevant variables than to include irrelevant variables since in the former
case the coefficients will be biased, the disturbance variance overestimated, and
conventional inference procedures rendered invalid, while in the latter case the
coefficients will be unbiased, the disturbance variance properly estimated, and the
inference procedures properly estimated. This constitutes a fairly strong case for
including rather than excluding relevant variables in equations. There is, however,
a qualification. Adding extra variables, be they relevant or irrelevant, will lower the
precision of estimation of the relevant coefficients" (1984: 262). Inclusive
specifications thus tend to produce more conservative significance tests.

to its contribution to clarity, centering is methodologically useful as it
helps to reduce collinearity between main effects and the interaction term
(Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken, 2003).
We follow past researchers and measure the dependent variable with
the number of sworn police officers per 100,000 population (Jacobs, 1979).
To provide time for the relationships in question to be completed, the
number of officers is measured in the year after a decennial census. This
variable also is in natural log form to reduce problems with outliers and
heteroskedasticity.
SPECIFICATION
Theoretical considerations suggest that, except for the negative
relationship we expect between city managers and police strength, the
coefficients on all remaining linear effects save those not theorized should
be positive. We expect that the percentage of Hispanics, the divorce rate,
and the murder rates will only produce additional police officers after
these factors reach levels that produce enhanced demands for law and
order. If expansions after an inflection point produce increased police
strength, the coefficients on the square of these three variables should be
positive.
A general specification of these fixed-effects models is:
POLICE OFFICERS PER POPt = b0 + b1%BLACKt-1 + b2(%BLACKt-1 x
YR1990 t-1) + b3(%BLACKt-1 x YR2000 t-1) + b4(%BLACKt-1 x SEGREGATIONt-1) +
2

b5(SEGREGATIONt-1 x SOUTHt-1) + b6%HISPANICt-1 + b7%HISPANIC t-1 + b8MURDER
2

RATESt-1 + b9MURDER RATES t-1+ b10CITYMANAGER t-1 + b11MEDIANINCt-1 +
2

b12POVERTYt-1 + b13DIVORCERATEt-1+ b14DIVORCERATE t-1+ b15CROWDINGt-1
+ b16SEGREGATIONt-1 + b17POPt-1 + b18YEAR1990 + b19YEAR2000 + e.

(1)

with all variables defined as above. Because regional effects are captured
by the city specific dummy variables (whose coefficients will not be shown
in the tables), the required main effects are represented by b1, b16, b18, and
b19. Because we predict signs, all significance tests save those on the period
dummies and the intercepts are one-tailed.

ANALYSES
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CROSS-TABULATION
Table 1 shows the expected signs, the variable means, and their
standard deviations. The per capita number of police officers in these
cities has grown in each of the three periods we analyze. In 1981 this mean
was 216.2 officers per 100,000 population, yet by 1991 it had risen to 230.6

and by 2001 to 255.6. Officers per 100,000 city residents ranged from 108.5
in Anchorage, Alaska in 1991 to 756.8 in Washington, DC in the same
year. An inspection of these rankings suggests that smaller, socially
homogeneous communities have the fewest officers relative to their
populations, but the large, racially diverse older cities seem to have the
most.5 To provide an intuitive picture of how police strength covaries with
three important explanatory variables, Table 2 shows mean police strength
cross-classified by the percentage of African Americans, the percentage of
Hispanics and by the presence of a city manager. Relevant comparisons
always support our expectations about race as all cell means increase in
rows with larger percentages of African Americans. But these contrasts
imply that Hispanic presence may not have as much explanatory power as
race. Compared to cities without a city manager, mean officers are
substantially reduced if cities have this political arrangement. These simple
comparisons may not persist after many additional factors are held
constant in the fixed-effects analyses, but they nevertheless imply that
some of our most important suppositions are correct. The correlation
matrix presented in Table 3 shows that these associations are relatively
modest.
Table 1. Predicted Signs, Means, and Standard Deviations
(N = 373 city-years)
Variable
Prediction
Mean
Ln police per 100,000
5.394
Ln % black
+
2.773
Segregation rate
+
59.852
% Hispanic
+
11.197
% unemployed
+
1.795
Real median income
+
414.018
1 if city manager
.424
% divorced
+
10.680
Murder rate
+
16.134
Ln % poverty
+
2.537
Ln crowding
+
1.556
Population per 100,000
+
4.287

5.

SD
.341
1.021
14.521
13.941
.443
79.402
.495
2.190
12.827
.396
.605
7.816

Socially homogeneous cities with the fewest officers per 100,000 include Fresno CA
(114.2 in 1990), Modesto CA (117.8 in 1980), Anaheim CA (121.5 in 2000), and
Eugene OR (123.5 in 2000). Cities with the most included Baltimore MD (507.5 in
2000), Honolulu HI (517.3 in 2000), Las Vegas NV (533.3 in 1980), and Washington
DC (630.5 in 2000). Other older large cities such as New York and Chicago had
comparatively large police departments as well.

Table 2. Mean Police Officers per 100,000 Cross-Classified
Cities without a City Manager
% Hispanic
Low
Moderate
High

Cities with a City Manager
% Hispanic
Low
Moderate
High

156.4
213.0
195.3
151.5
177.2
158.4
(16)
(15)
(9)
(9)
(12)
(36)
Moderate 205.5
234.7
287.3
195.5
211.8
191.5
(36)
(29)
(22)
(6)
(20)
(21)
High
267.9
337.4
357.2
252.1
244.4
268.4
(42)
(29)
(17)
(28)
(19)
(7)
Anova F test =
43.0 p < .000
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the number of city-years in a cell, N = 373 cityyears
% Black

Low

FIXED-EFFECTS RESULTS
To facilitate comparisons, we begin with a basic specification presented
in Model 1 in Table 4. Although racial effects are included in the first
model, we (temporarily) ignore nonlinear and interaction effects. In
Model 2 we enter interactions between period and the percentage of
African Americans to discover whether the relationship between racial
threat and police strength has shifted in the last two decades. Recall that
this test is conducted by multiplying the 1990 and 2000 period dummy
variables by the percentage of blacks. If the coefficients on these two
interaction terms are significant with the main effects held constant, we
can conclude that the magnitude of this racial threat relationship has
expanded or contracted in that period. In this model we also introduce
Hispanic presence and its square along with a similar quadratic test of
divorce rate effects to capture nonlinear relationships. In Model 3 in Table
4 we add the property and the violent crime rates to the explanatory
variables included in Model 2.
The results in Model 1 suggest that the most residentially segregated
cities with higher unemployment rates have more police officers relative to
their populations. As expected, however, city manager presence leads to
reductions in police strength. Yet absent tests for period specific
interactions, the presence of blacks has no effect on this outcome. The
significance tests on the two period-specific dummy variables indicate that
there is sufficient overtime variation in the dependent variable to estimate
with fixed-effects.

Table 3. Correlation Matrix (N = 373 city-years)
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
1 Ln police per 100,000 1.000
2 Ln % black
.576 1.000
3 Segregation rate
.474 .686 1.000
4 % Hispanic
-.094 -.279 -.161 1.000
5 % unemployed
.143 .284 .324 -.006 1.000
6 Real median income -.279 -.394 -.422 -.032 -.614 1.000
7 1 if city manager
-.308 -.153 -.202 .221 -.081 .063 1.000
8 % divorced
-.177 -.117 -.163 -.086 -.189 .058 .172 1.000
9 Murder rate
.429 .569 .540 -.042 .417 -.440 -.107 -.012 1.000
10 Ln % poverty
.469 .610 .448 .189 .547 -.783 -.102 -.121 .529 1.000
11 Ln crowding
.160 .070 .101 .708 .052 .015 .172 -.112 .279 .318 1.000
12 Population
.253 .097 .279 .226 .061 .018 -.134 -.204 .154 .127 .329 1.000
13 1 if 1990
-.034 .007 -.008 -.017 .347 -.044 -.011 -.005 .107 .126 -.024 -.002 1.000
14 1 if 2000
.177 .045 -.259 .182 -.549 .269 -.001 .250 -.199 .056 .203 .029 -.498

Table 4.

Pooled Time-Series Models 1–3, Ln. Police Officers per
100,000 in Large Cities

Explanatory
Variable
1 if 1990
1 if 2000
Real median income
Ln % unemployed
Segregation rate
6
Population / 10
1 if city manager
Ln % black
Ln % black in 1990
Ln % black in 2000
% divorced
2
% divorced

Model 1
Coefficient
.0487***
.1977***
-.0002
.0676*
.0028*
-.0026
**
-.1254
.0893
—
—
—

Model 2

SE Coefficient
SE
.0159
.0044 .0169
**
.0297
.0950 .0337
*
.0002
.0005 .0002
**
.0315
.0850 .0298
.0016
-.0004 .0014
.0113
.0534
.0565
—
—
—

**

.0208
-.2651***
.1910***
.0485***
***
.0932
**
-.0776

Model 3
Coefficient
.0121
***
.1064
.0005*
**
.0759
-.0003
**

.0081
.0710
.0542
.0109
.0132
.0304

.0226
-.2651***
***
.1901
.0479***
.0904***
-.0764**

***
.0047 .0014
***
-.0115 .0034
***
.0002 .0001

.0046***
-.0113***
***
.0002

SE
.0187
.0344
.0002
.0305
.0015
.0083
.0708
.0532
.0109
.0134
.0292

.0013
% Hispanic
.0034
2
% Hispanic
—
—
.0001
Ln violent crime
rate
—
—
—
—
-.0211
.0271
Ln property crime
rate
—
—
—
—
.0445
.0336
Intercept
5.3374*** .1209
5.3622*** .2098
5.1134*** .2932
2
.912***
.938***
.938***
R (corrected)
AIC
-804
-932
-930
Significance: * < .05 ** < .01 *** < .001 (standard errors to the right of coefficients;
1-tailed tests on all coefficients except the intercepts and period
dummy variables; standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity).
Note:
N = 373 city-years; coefficients on city dummies not shown
—
—

—
—

In Model 2 we find that the percentage of Hispanics, and the divorce
rate have nonlinear relationships with the dependent variable. As
expected, both variables must reach thresholds before police strength
starts to expand (we defer reporting inflection points until the discussion
of the best model.) But the most important contrast between Model 1 and
Model 2 concerns racial effects. When the coefficient on the percentage of
blacks is not forced to be identical in different periods, the explanatory
power of racial threat sharply increases. These interactions between racial
threat and period suggest that the association between black presence and
police strength became stronger in both 1990 and 2000. The reduction in

the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) score for Model 2 suggests that this
specification has much greater explanatory power than the specification
used in Model 1. In the last model in Table 4, we add the property and
violent crime rates, but the results show that although the explanatory
variables that were significant in Model 2 continue to matter, neither of
these perhaps overly aggregated crime rates explains police strength.
We still need to discover whether other interaction effects
influence police department strength. Theory suggests that the number of
officers should differ in segregated cities with larger percentages of blacks
or in segregated cities in the South. In light of the weak influence of the
aggregated crime rates, we also should use the murder rates in place of
these combined rates. In Model 4 in Table 5 we start by entering an
interaction between residential segregation and the percentage of blacks
and we replace the aggregated crime rates with the murder rates and their
square. In Model 5 we add an interaction between residential segregation
and city location in the South. Recall from the theoretical discussion that
residentially segregated cities with larger black populations should need
fewer officers if racial separation reduces black threat. The same
prediction about police strength reductions should hold when the
interaction between residential segregation and city location in the South
is assessed. Finally, in Model 6 we add crowding and the poverty rates to
capture otherwise unmeasured social disorganization effects.
The findings in Model 4 suggest that expansions in the murder rates
explain police strength, but the murder rates do not produce additional
officers until they reach a threshold. The coefficient on the interaction
between the percentage of black residents and residential segregation
supports a supposition that the most racially segregated cities with the
largest black populations are likely to have fewer police officers relative to
their population. After we add the interaction between residential
segregation and location in the South in Model 5, we find strong evidence
that residential separation between the races reduces police strength in
this region. The substantial reduction in the AIC statistic suggests that the
inclusion of this interaction term produces a sizeable increase in model
explanatory power. Finally in Model 6 in Table 5, we add the percentage
of families below the poverty line and the percentage of dwelling units
with more than 1.01 persons per room, but the results suggest that these
indicators of social disorganization have no effects on police strength.
We use the point estimates from the best model (see Model 5 in Table
5) to calculate the inflection points for the quadratic specifications and
find that the percentage of Hispanics in a city must grow to about 25.4
percent or more than five times its median (or 4.9 percent) before the per
capita number of officers starts to expand due to increases in this minority
population. This result suggests that the percentage of Hispanics must go

Table 5. Pooled Time-Series Models 4–6, Ln Police Officers per 100,000 in
Large Cities
Model 4
Coefficient
SE
1 if 1990
.0147 .0168
1 if 2000
.1294*** .0327
Real median income
.0004* .0002
Ln % unemployed
.0961*** .0292
Segregation rate
.0006 .0015
*
Population / 106
.0189 .0087
**
1 if city manager
-.1924 .0797
Ln % black
.1381** .0523
**
Ln % black in 1990
.0322 .0116
Ln % black in 2000
.0783*** .0159
% divorced
-.0721** .0297
2
***
% divorced
.0043 .0013
***
% Hispanic
-.0108 .0032
2
% Hispanic
.0002*** .0001

Model 5
Model 6
Coefficient SE Coefficient
SE
.0081 .0158
.0085 .0213
***
**
.1089 .0319
.1124 .0387
*
.0004 .0002
.0004 .0003
.0786** .0296
.0822** .0311
*
.0028* .0014
.0025 .0012
*
**
.0185 .0081
.0195 .0082
**
**
-.1616 .0630
-.1629 .0660
.1471** .0513
.1550** .0545
*
*
.0260 .0113
.0239 .0111
***
.0679 .0149
.0655*** .0149
*
-.0582 .0284
-.0626* .0285
.0038*** .0012
-.0097*** .0031

.0040*** .0012
-.0079* .0040

.0002*** .0001
-.0020 .0019

.0002*** .0001
-.0019 .0019

Murder rate
-.0015 .0019
2
Murder rate
.0001** .0000
.0001** .0000
.0001** .0000
Ln % black
x segregation
-.0021* .0012
-.0018* .0009
-.0017* .0010
***
South x segregation
—
—
-.0055 .0016
-.0054*** .0016
Ln poverty rate
—
—
— —
.0020 .0638
Ln crowding
—
—
— —
-.0287 .0364
***
***
***
5.2922 .2041
5.3179 .2909
Intercept
5.3288 .2156
2
***
***
***
R (corrected)
.941
.943
.943
AIC
-949
-964
-961
*
**
***
Significance: < .05 < .01 < .001 (standard errors to the right of coefficients; 1tailed tests on all coefficients except the intercepts and period dummy
variables; standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity).
Note:
N = 373 city-years; coefficients on city dummies not shown

beyond about the 87th percentile before this menace will produce
additional police officers. Figure 1 provides a graphic depiction of this
relationship using an augmented component plus residual plot (Mallows
1986) with cubic splines to estimate the nonlinear fit.6 The equivalent
6.

Augmented component plus residual plots probably give the most accurate picture
of departures from linearity with all other effects held constant. To isolate this
nonlinear relationship, the graph in Figure 1 is based on the specification in Model

inflection point for the relationship between the divorce rate and police
strength is about 7.6 percent, or a value about equal to the 10th percentile
in the distribution of these city divorce rates. This association therefore
becomes positive after divorce rates expand past a low threshold. Finally,
the murder rates must grow to a point just below their mean (the mean
murder rate is 16.1) or a rate of about 15.8 murders per 100,000 residents
before the threat posed by increasingly substantial homicide rates starts to
produce additional officers.

A u g m e nt e d co m p o n e n t p lu s re sid u a l
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6

Figure 1. Hispanics in Cities and Police Officers per 100,000 (nonlinear fit
estimated with a cubic spline; N = 373 city-years)
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The strength of some of the linear relationships we have detected is not
trivial. If we use the point estimates from Model 5 in Table 5, these values
suggest that the elimination of a city manager will lead to about thirty-five
additional police officers with all other explanatory variables held at their
means. This addition represents about a 15 percent increase in the mean
number of officers in these cities.7 With all of the other explanatory

7.

5 without the squared percentage of Hispanics.
From 1980 to 2000 only two cities shifted from having or not having a city manager.

variables held at their means in an equation not shown (in this equation
we estimate the coefficients on all three period interactions rather than
those on the main effect and two period interactions in the reported
models), the point estimates suggest that a standard deviation increase in
the percentage of blacks in 2000 should lead to roughly eighty additional
police officers per 100,000 city residents.
Other plausible explanatory effects do not matter. Additional political
or conflict effects such as the presence of a black mayor or the rate of
black killings of whites do not explain the population standardized number
of sworn officers. Alternative interactions such as those that assess
Hispanic presence in the Southwest do not account for police strength.8
The extensive controls that include both the case- and time-specific
dummy variables, the many explanatory factors that are held constant, the
substantial explanatory power of these equations, and the results of the
diagnostic tests all imply that this analysis has uncovered the primary
explanations for the population corrected number of police officers in
large U.S. cities since 1981.9

8.

9.

Wooldridge, however, states that fixed-effects models will provide accurate
estimates even if only a modest amount of overtime variation in an explanatory
variable is present (2002). The cross-sectional variation is far more substantial than
the over-time variation in this city manager variable. Because random-effects
models capture both over-time and cross-sectional variation, we ran such models to
see if random-effects findings about the influence of city managers differ from the
fixed-effects results we report, but they do not. Although the point estimates
become less substantial in the random-effects models, the negative coefficient on
the city manager variable remains highly significant. The fixed-effects estimates we
report probably are more accurate than the random-effects alternatives as
Hausman tests support a fixed- rather than random-effects approach. Note as well
that the city-specific dummy variables in the fixed-effects models have substantial
explanatory power. Both findings suggest that omitted variable bias may be present
if random-effects models are used instead of fixed-effects.
Although it is unlikely due to the 10-year separation between cross-sections, serial
correlation may be distorting the results. Most corrections for serial correlation in
fixed-effects models remove the first cross-section. Such an analysis therefore
would be restricted to cities in 1990 and 2000, but the statistical interactions we test
require three periods. An alternative involves White period corrections to the
standard errors (Lilien, 2004: 854). Because this method does not remove the first
cross-section, when we re-estimate Models 5 and 6 using this procedure in Eviews
5.1, we find that the same explanatory variables are statistically significant.
Residuals graphed on the fitted (or the predicted) scores show the appropriate
random cloud of points with no discernable patterns. More specific graphs of
residuals on each of the explanatory variables give appropriate results as well, save
for occasional heteroskedasticity, but we eliminate this threat to the standard errors
with the White correction. New York had the largest (but still reasonable) leverage
score, but, due to that city's extreme size, that finding enhances the plausibility of
these models. The models reported in Table 5 pass the Ramsey-Reset test for
specification error. A variety of other diagnostic tests and graphs suggest that no

CONCLUSIONS
FINDINGS
Most of the theoretical expectations that motivated this analyses have
been supported. Although our main theoretical impetus led to a focus on
the relationships between minority threat and law enforcement strength,
the results are informative about other interesting explanations as well.
Save for the first less than complete model, the results always show that
population matters. As theoretical considerations and prior findings
suggest, this evidence indicates that studies that analyze smaller cities
(Greenberg et al. 1985) are not as likely to find relationships between
minority threat and police strength. Explanations involving social
disorganization, however, had mixed effects. Probably due to the large
number of domestic violence calls that police departments must handle,
higher divorce rates after a minimal threshold evidently produce
additional officers. Yet neither poverty nor within dwelling unit crowding
explains the population corrected number of sworn officers.
Explanations borrowed from political science were corroborated as well.
Many studies in this discipline have assessed the determinants of expensive
public policies in U.S. states. These investigations almost always show that
various measures of the tax base are strong determinants of such policies.
Most of the coefficients reported in Tables 4 and 5 support this account: the
real median family income indicator of a city’s ability to support larger
police departments was significant in four of the six models. This variable’s
weak effect in the final model probably is due the high correlation between
median income and the percentage below the poverty line, but it is
noteworthy that the addition of the poverty indicator had no effects on the
significance of other coefficients in that model. The results, however, offer
more consistent support for another perhaps more interesting political
effect. Cities with appointed (rather than elected) city managers economize
by hiring fewer officers. This strong relationship proved robust despite the
formidable controls included in these two-way fixed-effects models. The
findings also do not contradict neo-Marxist explanations derived from the
literature on punishment as the results in all models suggest that cities with
higher unemployment rates had more officers.
Although the aggregated property and violent crime rates did not
explain variation in police strength, another more plausible crime related
account was influential. After the association between the murder rates
and police strength was specified so it could depart from linearity, another
serious statistical problems are present in sufficient strength to cast doubt on the
findings.

threshold relationship surfaces. Increasingly substantial murder rates
produced additional police officers only if the murder rates almost reached
the mean for all cities. This result makes sense for several reasons. First,
the murder rate counts in the Uniform Crime Reports probably are more
accurately measured than the other crime rates enumerated in this source.
Second, it is plausible that politically influential citizens would make
successful political demands for additional officers after this most serious
of all crimes expanded past a threshold and therefore became increasingly
conspicuous.
In light of the modest Hispanic populations in most U.S. cities but the
large proportions in a few, we expected that the percentage of Hispanics
would have to reach relatively high thresholds before the threat posed by
this ethnic group would become substantial enough to produce additional
officers. The results confirm this prediction as we find a positive
relationship only after the percentage of Hispanics grew to beyond about
25.4 percent, or slightly more than five times its median. Although this
ethnic threat explanation always accounts for police strength, its effects in
most cities are weaker than racial threat. Perhaps such contrasting results
should not be surprising in light of the fiercely divisive, sometimes lethal
disputes about race throughout U.S. history together with the modest
Hispanic populations in the great majority of U.S. cities. If this minority
group continues to expand at its current rapid rate, but assimilation does
not keep pace with the growth, subsequent studies may find that the
relationship between the threat posed by Hispanic presence and police
strength may become increasingly pronounced and different in shape.
The multiple findings about racial threat are not as simple. First,
probably the most important finding concerns trends. The coefficients on
the interactions with the period dummy variables show that the
relationship between the percentage of African Americans and the per
capita number of police officers has become stronger at least in the last
two census years. We can conclude from such results that the law
enforcement consequences of racial threat are not diminishing despite the
purported progress in race relations since the civil rights era. The results
instead suggest that the overall growth in mean department strength in
these large cities since 1980 is at least partly due to the stronger
relationships between racial threat and the expensive approach to social
control provided by larger police departments.
The results indicate that other theoretically interesting contingent
effects are present as well. The negative effects of the interaction between
African American presence and residential segregation suggest that fewer
police officers can be expected when a substantial black population is
residentially isolated from urban areas where whites reside. It follows
from all of these results that larger black populations evidently produce

more police officers, but when such populations are geographically
isolated from white neighborhoods, they probably become less
threatening. Such reductions in racial threat lead to an expectation that
the per capita number of police officers should be reduced in the most
segregated cities with larger African American populations, and that, of
course, is exactly what we find.
Finally, another contingent implication of the racial threat account is
supported by the significant negative coefficients on the interaction
between residential segregation and city location in the South. These
results suggest that racial segregation sharply reduces police strength in
this region, perhaps because the police in the South are more likely to
assume that black citizens want less law enforcement. If this assumption is
correct, officers would not be as likely to intervene in residentially
segregated black neighborhoods (Wilson, 1971) and these cities would not
need departments as large as cities with departments that aggressively
police the ghetto.
WIDER IMPLICATIONS
In this study we have attempted to fill some important gaps in the
literature on racial and ethnic threat and police strength. Because studies
that assessed these threat effects were almost entirely cross-sectional and
based on earlier data, recent shifts in the strength of threat accounts could
not be assessed. Our approach probably produced findings that were more
accurate in part because the statistical power necessary to detect
interaction and nonlinear effects is enhanced when analyses are based on
the larger number of cases made available by a panel design. And the twoway fixed-effects estimators we use let us test interactions with the period
dummy variables to discover whether statistically significant fluctuations
in the strength of the relationship between racial threat and police
strength have occurred.
Such methodological refinements led to several other novel results that
increase the plausibility of the racial threat account. First, we found
several theoretically interesting nonlinear relationships that suggest that
some explanatory variables must reach thresholds before they have effects
on police strength. Second, one logical implication of the racial version of
conflict theory is that in cities in which blacks are residentially separated
from whites, majority white political demands for added police officers
should be reduced. The supportive findings presented in this article also
enhance the credibility of threat theory, especially when the relative
number of police officers in large U.S. cities is at issue.
But several caveats are necessary. First, our models are not designed to
explain the number of police on the street. Majority whites in cities with

larger and more threatening minority populations can successfully express
their preferences for additional officers. Yet they cannot control how
these additional officers will be used. Citizens have little information
about the division of labor within their city’s department. In fact, a
principal-agent relationship exists between citizens and their chief
municipal political executive. Voters can support a political candidate who
appears to be more likely than others to hire additional officers, but in
most cities the mayor hires and fires the police executive who controls the
department’s division of labor. These agent decisions cannot be readily
observed by principals who only can vote or not vote for the mayor. In
emergencies, of course, specialist officers who normally would not be on
the streets can be used for this purpose. The population-corrected number
of sworn officers is therefore a good indicator of a department’s total
control capacity. And because there undoubtedly is a close association
between the number police officers and the number of officers on the
street, our results imply that explanations derived from threat theory
should account for the number of officers on the street. Yet the need for
three cross-sections imposed by our statistical models means that we must
leave such questions about within department task allocations and the
number of officers on patrol for another study.10
Second, one disadvantage of a city-level approach concerns the absence
of explanatory factors that intervene between the determinants we can
assess and police strength. Such a difficulty is present in almost all studies
of the relationships between racial threat and criminal justice outcomes
(and in most other studies as well). Direct indicators of white political
activity due to minority threat cannot be incorporated into a multiperiod
multicity analysis like this because such indicators are unavailable. Other
findings, however, make threat-based assumptions about the intervening
links between minority presence and police strength difficult to dispute.
We know that larger black populations in cities (Liska et al., 1982) or in
neighborhoods (Quillian and Pager, 2001) produce enhanced fear of crime
even after the crime rates have been held constant. We also know that
whites act politically at least in part due to such fears and to resentments
against minority street criminals because expansions in minority
populations produce increased white votes for anti-minority candidates
(Giles and Buckner, 1993; Giles and Hertz, 1994). Note as well that such
candidates are invariably strong supporters of harsh law and order
measures. Both considerations strongly suggest that increases in the size of
minority populations produce expansions in the number of police officers
10. Data on the internal allocation of police tasks apparently only exists for these or
equivalent departments in 1990 and in 2000. Yet as we state in note 8, largely due
to the interaction effects we test, our models require data from 1980 as well as
cross-sections in the latter two census years.

because threatened whites make successful demands for such an outcome.
We can infer from these supplemental findings that the links between
minority threat and police strength are probably due to the intervening
explanatory factors spelled out in the politically informed version of threat
theory we test in this study.
Probably the most important substantive conclusion, however, concerns
the implications of the findings about racial effects. Robust results
showing that there is an increasingly strong relationship between the
presence of larger black populations and the number police officers in
cities after many important explanatory effects have been held constant
provide evidence about how important this minority threat explanation is,
at least in a society with such a bitter history of racial conflict. In contrast
to an optimistic view that racial threat is becoming less important, our
findings suggest that this association is increasing in strength. The growth
since 1980 in the association between African American presence and
such an expensive form of social control suggests that the U.S. criminal
justice system is still not color blind. Unfortunately, police strength in the
United States continues to respond to racial and ethnic effects that should
be irrelevant.
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